Interpret carefully: this is an inspectable synthetic model, not evidence about real farmers or a policy recommendation. Change one assumption at a time to see what drives the result.
Choose assumptions
PS1 baseline: farmer payment w = 6, unit cost c = 4, household valuation gap = 4.
Model and decision rule
q = D × r × e × max(0, 4 − m)
pi_F = (6 − 4)q − K
pi_I = mq − lambda e²
For a fixed margin, the model searches effort from 0 to 1. For a chosen margin, it searches margins from 0 to 4 and effort from 0 to 1. The farmer group participates only when net earnings are nonnegative. This is a transparent grid search, not a trained AI model or a field estimate.
Synthetic outcome
Cards show the highlighted rule; the table compares both rules under identical assumptions.
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| Rule | Margin | Effort | Purchases | Farmer net | Intermediary profit | Participation |
|---|
Reflection prompt
If coordination cost rises while all other assumptions remain unchanged, farmer participation is most directly at risk: K reduces farmer net earnings and can cause the group to exit.